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*Honorable William H. Yohn, Jr., Senior District Judge for the United States
District Court for  the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
               NOT  PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 05-3191 
___________
JOY P. COOKE,
               Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES,
                    Respondent
___________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(No. A91-309-549 )
Immigration Judge: Henry S. Dogin
___________
ARGUED APRIL 26, 2006
BEFORE: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, and  NYGAARD,  Circuit Judges, 
and YOHN,  District Judge.*
(Filed May 31, 2006)
___________
2Ruchi Thaker, Esq. (Argued)
Bretz & Coven
305 Broadway, Suite 100
New York, NY 10007
Counsel for Petitioner
Donna A. Krappa, Esq. (Argued)
Office of the United States Attorney
970 Borad Street, Room 700
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Respondent
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Joy Cooke appeals the Board of Immigration and Appeals’ order denying
her motion to reopen her immigration proceeding.  Because we conclude that the BIA
failed to address her claim that the Immigration Judge erred by failing to advise her of her
“apparent eligibility” for a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(h), we will grant Cooke’s petition for review and remand the cause to the BIA.
I.
Joy Cooke, a native and citizen of Jamaica, gained admittance as a lawful
permanent resident (“LPR”) in the United States in 1991.  She has three children who are
United States citizens, ages 21, 14, and 10.  She is married to a United States citizen
although they do not currently live together.  She is the primary caretaker of her three
3children and is employed as a healthcare worker.  Beginning in 1991 and continuing over
the next eight years, Cooke was convicted approximately ten times of petit larceny,
attempted petit larceny, shoplifting, and receiving stolen property under New York and
New Jersey laws.  However, none of these convictions were felonies.  She served jail time
for only two of these convictions.  She has not been convicted of any crime since 1999.
At some point before 2001, Cooke left the United States for a short trip to
Jamaica.  Upon returning to the United States at Newark International Airport, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service issued a Notice to Appear against her.  The
Notice advised her that the INS was instituting deportation proceedings against her and
charged her as an arriving alien who was inadmissible to the United States under INA §
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), as an alien convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude. 
After being issued the Notice, Cooke hired a New York attorney to
represent her in connection with her deportation proceeding.  As her attorney, he was
responsible for advising her of any forms of relief from removal for which she might be
eligible.  But, at no time after he was retained and engaged with her case, nor at the
removal hearings did he ever advise Cooke that she was eligible for a waiver under INA §
212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), as a returning lawful permanent resident with more than
seven years’ residency, no aggravated felony convictions, and a qualifying relative.
4In fact, at the removal hearings the IJ discussed with her attorney the forms
of relief for which Cooke might have been eligible.  In response, her attorney applied for
cancellation of removal for Cooke under INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, which the IJ
properly denied because Cooke was statutorily ineligible.  The IJ then questioned Cooke’s
attorney as to whether there was any other form of relief for which Cooke might be
eligible and the attorney replied in the negative. 
After the hearing, the IJ issued a written decision denying Cooke’s
application for cancellation of removal pursuant to § 240A, and, never raising the
possibility of relief under § 212(h), ordered Cooke removed to Jamaica.  Cooke appealed
the decision to the BIA, still not raising the § 212(h) possibility for relief.  The BIA
affirmed the IJ’s order.  
After consulting with new attorneys, Cooke discovered that she could have
applied for § 212(h) relief.  She then filed a timely motion to reopen with the BIA,
arguing that she had received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney had
failed to apply for § 212(h) relief on her behalf.  Additionally, she argued that the IJ
should have recognized her “apparent eligibility” for § 212(h) relief and, pursuant to 8
C.F.R. § 1240.11 (formerly 8 C.F.R. § 240.11), was required to advise her that she was
eligible to apply for it. 
The BIA denied Cooke’s motion to reopen.  It concluded, without
discussion, that the “motion does not demonstrate that [Cooke] is eligible for [INA §
1. The BIA’s decision reads in full:
The respondent moves the Board pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 to reopen
our decision dated December 17, 2002.  The respondent claims ineffective
assistance of former counsel.  See Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA
1988), aff’d, 857 F.2d 10 (1  Cir. 1988).  She declares that her former counselst
failed to seek relief on her behalf for which she was eligible, specifically relief
under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act on the basis of
extreme hardship to her United States citizen children.  See Matter of Mendez, 21
I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).  However, her motion does not demonstrate that she
is eligible for such relief. 
Moreover, the respondent has not shown that she merits reopening as a
matter of discretion.  The respondent has ten larceny-related convictions since the
mid-1980's.  Given this history of criminal activity and disregard for this
country’s laws, it is highly unlikely that she would be granted relief from
removal, even if she were eligible to be considered for relief.  Accordingly, we
find that the respondent has not established a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel to warrant reopening in this case.  See Matter of Assad, 23 I&N Dec. 553
(BIA 2003).  The motion is denied. 
5
212(h)] relief.”   Additionally, the BIA held that Cooke’s proceeding “did not merit1
reopening as a matter of discretion” because “it is highly unlikely that Cooke would be
granted relief from removal.”  Consequently, the BIA rejected Cooke’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.
Cooke filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the BIA’s
order of removal.  Cooke’s habeas petition contended that: (1) the IJ and the BIA violated
her right to due process because they failed to follow the regulation requiring IJs to
inform aliens of their apparent eligibility  for relief; (2) her right to due process was
violated due to ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) the BIA violated her right to due
process because it “failed to follow case law.”  However, under § 106 of the REAL ID
6Act, the United States district courts no longer have jurisdiction over habeas petitions. 
Under § 106(c)), her habeas petition was transferred to the court of appeals and converted
from a habeas petition to a petition for direct review pursuant to section 242(a) of the
INA.  See Bonhometre v. Gonzalez, 414 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2005).  Accordingly, and
because Cooke’s petition poses questions of law, we have jurisdiction to review.  See
Singh v. Gonzalez, 432 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2006).
II.
We review a denial of a motion to reopen an immigration proceeding for
abuse of discretion.  See Zheng v. Gonzalez, 422 F.3d 98, 106 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Motions to
reopen immigration proceedings are viewed with strong disfavor, and we review the
BIA’s decision to deny the reopening for abuse of discretion, mindful of the broad
deference that the Supreme Court would have us afford.”) (quoting Xu Long Lu v.
Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2001)) (internal quotations omitted).  
“Discretionary decisions of the Board will not be disturbed unless that are found to be
arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir.
2004) (quoting Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 1994)).  
To determine whether a Board decision is arbitrary,  irrational, or contrary
to law, we must be able to discern both that the BIA addressed the alien’s claims and that
its reasons for the decision are clearly expressed.  Awolesi v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 227, 233
(3d Cir. 2003) (citing Bastidas v. INS, 609 F.2d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 1979)).  Thus, where
2. The BIA’s failure to address the existence of Cooke’s apparent eligibility claim
precludes our ability to determine the basis for its decision.  At this juncture, the
government’s assertion that the BIA rejected this claim on the grounds of ineligibility and
discretion is only speculative.  
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the Board fails to adequately address some claim made by the alien in her motion to
reopen, or where it addresses that claim but fails to clearly articulate its reasons for its
finding, we cannot review the Board’s decision and will remand for reconsideration.  See
id. at 232  (“In order for [the Court] to be able to give meaningful review to the [Board]’s
decision, [the Court] must have some insight into its reasoning.”); Tipu, 20 F.3d at 586
(“[T]he Board failed to consider one of the factors in Tipu’s favor, a practice which in
Sotto v. INS resulted in a remand for reconsideration.”); see also INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S.
12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (“A court of appeals is not generally
empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its
own conclusions based on such an inquiry.  Rather, the proper course, except in rare
circumstances is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.”)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
Here, the BIA failed to address Cooke’s first claim that the IJ was required
to address her “apparent eligibility” for relief under § 212(h) relief.  The government does
not respond to this, other than to argue that Cooke was not eligible for section 212(h)
relief and, even assuming arguendo that she was, the BIA was within its discretion to
deny her motion to reopen.   This misses the mark.  The issue here is not whether Cooke2
3. Because we grant Cooke’s petition for review based on the BIA’s clear error in
failing to address her “apparent eligibility” claim, we do not reach the merits of Cooke’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim at this time.
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was ultimately eligible for section 212(h) relief or whether, assuming she was, the IJ
should have granted her such relief.  Rather, the issue here is the BIA’s responsibility to
address all of an alien’s claims of error.  Cooke’s first allegation of error was that the IJ
failed to advise her of her “apparent eligibility” for section 212(h) relief and there is
nothing in the BIA’s opinion addressing this claim.  
To trigger an IJ’s obligation to inform an alien concerning her “apparent
eligibility” of some form of relief, the alien must meet the threshold requirements for such
relief.  Moran-Enriquez v. INS, 884 F.2d 420, 422 (9  Cir. 1989).  Cooke offersth
meritorious reasons both for why the IJ was required to advise her of her apparent
eligibility for section 212(h) relief, see 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2), and for her apparent
eligibility.  She also argues that the record establishes that she met the statutory
requirements for eligibility of section 212(h) relief.  We, however, are not the appropriate
forum to review or address in the first instance her contention.  Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16,
123 S.Ct. at 355.  Instead, it is appropriate that we remand to the BIA so that it may
address Cooke’s claim that she was eligible for section 212(h) relief and that the IJ failed
to advise her of her apparent eligibility, in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2).3
III.
9We will grant Cooke’s petition for review, vacate the BIA’s May 30, 2003
decision denying her motion to reopen, and remand the cause to the BIA for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
